declined so much, why time worked has been so slow to recover to pre-recession levels, and to offer estimates of how the labor market might have been different with alternative public policies.
3
A recession is, by definition, a period when time worked declines. A variety of explanations have been offered for previous recessions: adverse productivity shocks (Kydland and Prescott 1982) , a surge in the demand for "liquidity" (Friedman and Schwartz (1963) ; Lucas, (2008) ), a collapse in international trade (Crucini and Kahn 1996) , and a stock market crash are among them. Do any of these explain the labor decline since 2007? This paper begins an answer to the question by examining the time series for labor productivity and real hourly wages, and finding that both series are higher now than they were in 2007.
In their studies of prior recessions, economists have closely examined the cyclicality of real wages -that is, whether real wages tend to fall during a recession and rise during an expansion (a pro-cyclical real wage), or instead rise during a recession and fall during expansions (a counter-cyclical real wage). John Maynard Keynes claimed in his General Theory that real wages were counter-cyclical: "… an increase in employment can only occur to the accompaniment of a decline in the rate of real wages." (Keynes 2008 (Keynes /1936 , although a counter-cyclical pattern is not readily observed in a number of recessions. 4 When it comes to the 2008-2009 recession, at least, I conclude that real wages and productivity are counter-cyclical.
3 I focus on labor usage -the total hours in the nation that people are working -as opposed to the "labor force" that includes persons who are not working, but are looking for work. In most cases, as in Figure 1 , my hours measures derive from hours tabulations by the Census Bureau or Bureau of Labor Statistics, which are tabulations of hours that employed persons are paid (and thereby include hours of paid vacation, sick days, etc.). In a few cases, noted below, it is important to distinguish paid work hours from hours actually worked, in which case I create my own hours-actually-worked series from the micro data from the Census Bureau's household survey. In a few cases, also noted below, employment is the only available labor usage measure. 4 See (Abraham and Haltiwanger 1995) for a review of that literature.
High wages and low employment make some sense from an employer's perspective because wages are the main cost of employing a worker. But that raises the question of whether potential workers are all that eager to take the jobs that are available, or instead whether something prevents millions of people eager for work from bidding down wages. My next step adapts some of the labor market ingredients that are common to both "New Keynesian" and "real business cycle" models in order to decompose the labor reductions since 2007 into three types of potential "causes": labor distortions and labor preferences that raise productivity and reduce labor, productivity shocks that reduce labor and productivity, and wealth and intertemporal substitution effects that reduce labor and raise consumption. I conclude that labor fell more than output during the [2008] [2009] recession while labor "supply" (defined more rigorously below) shifted to the left.
Analytically, this paper's decomposition is most like that of Katz and Murphy (1992) , who look at changes over time in the relative amounts and productivity of skilled and unskilled labor in order to determine the relative importance of supply and demand shocks. In terms of substance, this paper is about the changes over time in the overall levels of labor and labor productivity, which raises the possibilities of tax distortions, wealth effects, and intertemporal substitution effects that would be less important for understanding one skill group's changes relative to another. In this regard, my analysis is more like that of Chari et al (2007) , who also consider capital market fluctuations and total factor productivity. Gali et al (2007) , Mulligan (2002) and Mulligan (2005) are three other papers using the supply-demand decomposition to quantify labor market distortions over time; Hall (1997) uses it to quantify labor preference shifts.
Section I displays the basic time series used to make the decomposition: aggregate labor, consumption, and productivity per hour. Four aggregate changes since 2007 help gauge the relative importance of various explanations for the recession and slow recovery. First, in contrast to the patterns of some previous recessions/depressions, output fell significantly less than did labor hours. That is, labor productivity (output per hour) increased. Section II shows that labor productivity increased by an amount that suggests that total factor productivity continued to follow its previous upward trend. This finding suggests that the recession and slow recovery cannot primarily be explained by adverse productivity shocks such as interruptions to the production process created by unusually bad weather, strikes, labor immobility, or business sector attempts to economize on raw materials.
Second, as shown in Section III, aggregate labor compensation per hour is also significantly greater now than it was before the recession began. This finding suggests that wage-depressing impulses such as sectoral shifts in the direction of capital-intensive sectors, or perceived increases in employment costs (aside from wages themselves), cannot explain much of the recession. However, departures between the wage and productivity series since the middle of 2009 are consistent with some role for wagedepressing factors.
Third, consumption dropped significantly during the recession. As shown in more detail in Mulligan (2011) , this drop contradicts some of the investment collapse models of the recession because at least some of the resources freed up from foregone investment opportunities would have been used for additional consumption.
Fourth, as shown in Section IV, growth accounting suggests that, on average, the use of production inputs other than labor hours actually increased during the recession, when labor hours fell. This factor substitution finding appears to contradict claims that the 2008-9 recession began because people were spending less, and that their low spending forced the businesses serving them to cut output. The spending-impulse theories may be a good description of the declines in manufacturing, residential construction, and perhaps a couple of other industries where all factors of production were used less, but are difficult to reconcile with the increased use of non-labor production factors that happened in the rest of the economy.
Sections V and VI explain how all of these findings are consistent with increases in labor market distortions, akin to marginal tax rate hikes, that occurred during the recession. The amount of the consumption drop helps quantify the amount of the labor market distortion that would be needed to explain what happened in the labor market since 2007. An Appendix compares these results to analogous calculations for previous recessions.
I. Quarterly Indicators of Aggregate Economic Quantities
Figure 2 displays four quarterly seasonally adjusted indices of real per capita consumption since the beginning of 2007. 5 Two of them are exclusive to the private sector: private nondurable consumption goods and private consumption services. The third (blue) series is public non-defense consumption. The fourth (black) series aggregates the three, chain-weighting by their contributions to total expenditure. My purpose here is to measure current living standards, so purchases of consumer durables are excluded, and non-defense public consumption is combined with the private series (because much of public non-defense consumption is publically provided health care, schooling, and housing similar to what is provided by the private sector).
The figure also displays a dashed black line to represent a sustainable trend: an estimate of how much total consumption could have increased if the economy would have continued to produce and grow as it had prior to the recession. 6 All of the series have declined four or five percent below the trend, and are lower in absolute terms than they were before the recession began. The most rapid deviations from trend occurred in 2008 for the private series, and after early 2009 for the public sector.
Overall, it is clear that per capita consumption dropped, and dropped much less in percentage terms than labor ultimately did (labor per person fell about ten percent). It appears that most of the 4-5 percent consumption drop below trend occurred in 2008, and since early 2009 consumption has resumed somewhat of an upward trend. 7 As shown below, the direction and amounts of the consumption changes are informative about the recession's causes. 5 Real consumption is spending on consumption items and services, adjusted for inflation (that is, price changes) for those items and services, and therefore changes only if people change the number or quality of the items and services they purchase. 6 Specifically, the "sustainable trend" increases at 0.6 percent per year, my estimate (discussed in Mulligan (2011) ) of the rate of per capita total factor productivity growth. With some exceptions noted below, employee compensation per hour is thought to indicate marginal labor productivity to the extent that workers are paid their marginal product. 7 The combined series closely follows private sector services because (a) private nondurables and services follow a similar pattern and (b) public non-defense consumption expenditure is small compared to private expenditures on non-durables and services (the latter is the single largest expenditure category). By definition labor productivity is the ratio of output to hours worked, so it might seems almost automatic that the ratio would rise when its denominator falls, as it did in 2008 and 2009. However, as we see below, some of the severe recessions or depressions in the past have had output fall more than hours worked, and therefore labor productivity fell (see also Ohanian (2010) ). Even in this recession, sectors most obviously depressed by lack of demand had their hours and output fall in roughly equal proportions. The time pattern of labor productivity indicates something about the causes of the recession, as we examine in more detail below.
II. Movements Along an Aggregate Marginal Productivity Schedule
Goods and services are produced with labor and other factors of production, so it is no surprise that output fell at about the time that labor did. But that still leaves open the question of whether the usage of other factors of production change in the same amount, or even in the same direction, as labor did. The aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function helps arrive at an answer. According to that function, and based on the observation that about 70 percent of national income accrues to labor, quarter t's 8 Real GDP per hour is a more comprehensive measure of productivity than business sector productivity because the former includes all sectors in its numerator and all workers in its denominator. As a comprehensive measure, GDP per hour is more readily integrated with models of aggregate labor supply in which total hours worked is a key variable. However, productivity by itself is often measured for the narrower business sector because output in the remaining sectors (government, non-profit institutions, and households) may be measured less reliably. through 2011 Q2 can be decomposed using the marginal productivity schedule (0.1).
9 More generally, when factor market are competitive, the magnitude of the elasticity of productivity with respect to labor input is equal to the share of output paid to non-labor production factors. I assume that share to be 0.3, and assume that the share is independent of the amount of labor and the amount of other inputs. As noted below, this paper's qualitative results are not sensitive to either of these assumptions. 10 The concepts of labor productivity and the "input residual" are different from "total factor" or "multifactor" productivity, which attempt to measure the change in output that cannot be explained by changes in labor and capital inputs. In practice, the multifactor productivity measures prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics do not account for changes in capacity utilization, which is sometimes the primary reason why the input residual changes over time. Thus, while labor's path during the beginning of the recession might be explained by a reduction in other inputs, the overall pattern since 2007 has been a significant increase in other inputs and a large reduction in labor. A key question is why production shifted so suddenly and so dramatically away from labor hours and toward the usage of other inputs.
III. On Average, Real Wages did not Fall
It is possible that aggregate hourly compensation changes do not accurately measure changes in the average person's reward to working, perhaps because of a change in the composition of the workforce that effectively gives more weight in the aggregate to higher paid workers during recessions than during expansions. For example, employment could drop the most for less skilled workers (as it has in past recessions; Bils (1985) and Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) ), so that the average compensation (and output per hour) of those who remain employed rises even while none of those employees is compensated more than he was before the recession. Another possibility is that compensation is fixed for existing workers, but dropped during the recession for new hires, and it's the compensation of new hires that allocates labor in the marketplace.
Composition Bias is Relatively Small
The effect of changes in the composition of the workforce on aggregate hourly earnings and productivity is known as "composition bias," and the size of the bias depends on: (a) the percentage change in the size of the workforce, and (b) the degree to which persons leaving the workforce or joining the workforce have different hourly wages than the rest of the employees. On the second point, job losses during the recession were certainly not random. On the other hand, the composition changes by gender tended to reduce aggregate wage measures because the gender with the higher average wage (male) is the one that experienced the larger employment rate decline.
The bottom of the table shows that the construction and manufacturing industries sharply reduced employment. Manufacturing is the larger of the two, and its average hourly wage was somewhat greater than average. Healthcare is an example of an industry that increased its employment since 2007, and its average hourly earnings were close to the national average. Overall, it appears that changing industry composition did little, if anything, to increase aggregate hourly earnings (see also (Bils 1985, 667) ).
Based on the age, race, and schooling patterns shown in Table 1 , and based on the likely effects of some of the public policy impulses discussed Mulligan (2011) 
Wage Rates for Marginal Workers
For the purposes of understanding employer incentives to hire and potential employees' incentives to accept work, the wage rate for new hires and other workers with weak attachments to an employer may be more important than the average wage of all employees, and the latter may not evolve in the same way as the former. Nevertheless, my finding that, even after adjustments for composition, the average wage of all employees rose during the recession suggests that the average wage of marginal employees also rose (although perhaps in a different amount) because marginal workers are included in the overall average. 13 140 million workers earning an average of $20.20 per hour in 2007 plus 6 million workers earning an average of $5.50 per hour yields an overall average hourly earnings of $19.60 for the 146 million. In other words, the overall average understates the average for the 140 million by 3 percent. 14 The United States Department of Labor (2008), (2007) calculations for 2006 and 2007 suggest that less than two million people earned at or below the federal minimum wage. 15 As part of its work on multifactor productivity, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2011) considers changes in age, education, and gender, and finds that those sources of composition bias changed 1.4 percent from 2007 to 2009. In their study of composition bias for business cycles between 1967 and 1987 , Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994 found that aggregate wage measures fell 0.6 percent for each percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate. The direction of this result by itself shows that something different happened during the 2008-9 recession, but if we take their composition-bias-corrected estimate of 1.0 percent (this is a 2007 weighted average of their separate male and female estimates) and thereby infer composition bias of 0.4 percent for each national unemployment rate percentage point, or a total 1.8 percent for the 4.7 point national unemployment rate change that occurred between 2007 and 2009. For the reasons I cited in the text (see also (Bils 1985, 684) ; Keane, Moffitt, and Runkle (1988) ), I believe the Solon et al (1994) composition bias estimates may be exaggerated for my purposes, but still they imply that selectionbias-corrected real wages increased from 2007 to 2009.
To see this, suppose that a majority of the workforce, who number L, is paid pursuant to long term contract paying X, and will be employed under any contingency.
The remainder M of the workforce is hired in a spot market at rate w. Average hourly earnings are:
For small changes in w and M, the change in average hourly earnings is:
The first term on the right is the effect of the marginal workers' average wage change dw on the average change, holding the workforce composition constant. The second term is the composition bias. The change in the composition bias adjusted average wage therefore has the same sign as dw, and the amount of the change is proportional to the marginal workers' share of the workforce.
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IV. Was It Customer Demand? Factor Reduction and Factor Substitution by Industry
A reduction of labor usage during a recession with rising labor productivity is sometimes attributed to employer desires to reduce their production, which in turn derives from a lack of customer demand. If we assume that, as in a number of New Keynesian models (e.g., Woodford (2003)), non-labor inputs are fixed in the short run, then it follows from the diminishing returns to labor that reducing output involves reducing labor by an even greater proportion. The other input residual is constant by assumption.
However, if at least some of the other inputs are adjustable in the short run, then reducing output would involve reducing those inputs too. In this case, the other input residual would decline, and perhaps enough that labor productivity is constant.
The assumption that inputs other than work hours are constant is convenient for many purposes, but a complete analysis of productivity statistics needs it relaxed because other inputs are subject to some of the same economic forces as work hours (Jorgenson 2009 ). In particular, an increase in other inputs together with a reduction in labor hours would suggest that employers may have perceived labor to be more expensive, and would be difficult to reconcile with the view that labor was cut merely as a means of reducing output.
Particular industries undoubtedly experienced a reduction in demand since 2007.
We know, for example, that consumers cut their spending significantly, and one of the best ways to cut spending with minimum short-run impact on living standards is to reduce purchases of durable goods. 17 From the point of view of the manufacturers of those goods, customer demand fell. Residential construction is another industry that experienced reduced demand, as evidenced by the sharp decline in housing prices and increase in vacancy rates. To the degree that production inputs are adjustable, we expect manufacturing and residential construction to reduce their usage of all inputs, and not just work hours. Because efforts to reduce output should be associated with reductions in some of the other inputs, the fact that the other input residual increased on average for the entire economy ( Figure 4 ) and for the non-manufacturing, non-construction parts of the business sector (Table 2) , calls into to question the assertion that most industries cut their employment because of a lack of customer demand. A more obvious explanation for a substitution away from labor and toward other inputs is that businesses perceive labor to be more expensive than it was before the recession began. Below I use the consumption and productivity data to begin to quantify labor cost effects like this, and Mulligan (2011) separately quantifies labor cost effects using public policy measures.
V. Neither Wealth Effects nor Intertemporal Substitution Effects Explain the "Supply" Shift
Although my finding that the marginal productivity schedule (Figure 4 An influx of immigrant workers into the economy is an example of a supply change. The influx would, in the short run, push down wages as people compete for jobs, and lower wages would induce employers to hire more. In the process of putting more people to work, output would increase but productivity would fall. That would be a movement along Figure 4 's marginal productivity schedule in the direction of more labor and less productivity. A reduction in wealth is another supply change that would increase labor and reduce productivity.
A reduction in worker marginal tax rates -that is, an increase in the share of additional earnings a worker keeps after taxes -can also be interpreted as a supply change, and would also move the economy down the marginal productivity schedule.
But a reduction in employer payroll taxes would, for similar reasons, also increase labor and reduce productivity, so taxes are often referred to as labor market distortions.
Consumption and Leisure have Moved in Opposite Directions
The wealth effect explanation for movements up the marginal productivity schedule says that people work less because they feel richer. The intertemporal substitution effect says that people work less in 2009 because they view 2009 as a relatively bad time to work and produce, either because the return to saving is low or because they expect future labor productivity to be even higher than it is now. Both the wealth and substitution effect theories imply that consumption is high during the recession (Barro and King 1984) . Figure 4 -in the direction of more labor -so something else must be moving the economy up the schedule even more than the total change that combines the wealth and intertemporal substitution effects with other effects. In other words, if labor and productivity had remained constant while consumption had dropped, that itself would indicate an important change in the labor market because we expect adverse wealth effects to be associated with more labor and lower labor productivity.
A Labor Market Metric for Consumption Declines
Putting more structure on preferences for consumption and work permit me to quantify the size of the wealth and intertemporal substitution effects, and thereby the size of the leftward labor supply shift (or labor market distortion change) that would have occurred absent those effects. In particular, I assume that the month t marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption and leisure is proportional to the ratio of real consumption per person, and proportional to work hours per adult:
where c t is aggregate real consumption of nondurables and services (including public non-defense consumption), P t is population (adults and children), N t is the adult population, and n t is total labor time.  is a constant, assumed for the moment to be one, that can be interpreted as the Frisch elasticity of labor supply with respect to wages.
The MRS can be interpreted as the reservation wage of the marginal worker: the marginal worker is willing to work if and only if he is offered a wage that equals or exceeds his MRS. According to (0.5), this reservation wage increases with the marginal worker's living standard as measured by real consumption per capita: the lower is the living standard the lower the wage the marginal worker will accept. The dependence of the MRS on the amount of work hours n means that people are not willing to work still more hours unless offered a wage that is especially high. In other words, the equation version of (0.5) graphed in the [n,MRS] plane is a kind of labor supply function, with upward slope whose magnitude is determined by , and with consumption shifting the function up (a "wealth effect").
Absent labor market distortions and other determinants of the marginal rate of substitution, the marginal rate of substitution would equal marginal labor productivity.
Given the Cobb-Douglas assumption (0.1), marginal productivity is proportional to labor productivity, so that both average and marginal productivity changes have the same log changes over time. As explained by Mulligan (2005) , changes in the gap between (0.5) and average productivity y t are therefore measures of changes in the combined effect of changes in labor market distortions and other (omitted) determinants of the marginal rate of substitution. Denoting that gap as (1- t ), its changes can be calculated as:
In words, each log point that consumption declines is a log point that distortions must increase in order to explain a given path for labor and productivity.
With the only the data presented in this paper, one cannot determine whether the gap (1- t ) captures preferences or distortions. Henceforth, for the purposes of brevity, I
refer to -ln (1- t ) as the amount of labor market "distortion."
An appendix to this paper examines sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions about functional form, elasticity magnitude, and consumption concepts.
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However, only weak assumptions are needed to conclude that equation (0.6) is correct at least in terms of the qualitative effects of consumption, labor hours, and productivity on the labor market distortion. 22 Given that consumption and labor clearly fell during the recession, and labor productivity clearly rose, we must conclude that the distortion increased; the only question is the amount of that increase. 21 We also expect the MRS to depend on additional demographics, such as the age of the population, but demographics change very little at a business cycle frequency as compared to the amounts of change in consumption, labor, and productivity. For this reason, my analysis does not consider any additional demographics. 22 The marginal rate of substitution function (0.5), which corresponds to the utility function : recall that the distortion in Figure 6 is measured as -ln(1-).
20 much larger reductions in labor and output, the 1930's "Great Depression" was also different: both the input and labor supply residuals fell.
Wage measures are not part of equation (0.6) but, to the degree that wages can be reliably measured, could be used to decompose the overall distortion -the difference between log productivity and log MRS -into a difference between log productivity and the log wage and a difference between the log wage and the log MRS. The former difference is sometimes associated with employer-side distortions, such as employment costs they incur apart from wages, and the latter difference associated with employee-side distortions such as income taxes owed by employees on their wage income. However,
given that the gap between wage changes and productivity changes is small by  changes in other production inputs that change labor and output in the same direction,  (unmeasured) labor distortions and labor preferences that raise productivity, reduce labor, and reduce consumption, and  wealth and intertemporal substitution effects that reduce labor and raise consumption.
The macroeconomic concept of the "marginal productivity schedule" relating wages or output per hour worked to the number of hours worked -a concept shared by real business cycle models, New Keynesian models, and even Keynes' (2008 Keynes' ( /1936 General Theory -helps to isolate the first group of causes. Output declined enough less than work hours that it appears that other production inputs (aside from work hours) tended to increase during the recession. When viewed through the lens of any model in which aggregate output is a function of labor hours and other inputs with an elasticity of output with respect to hours of about 0.7, 25 the recession and slow recovery cannot primarily be explained by, or even associated with, adverse productivity shocks such as interruptions to the production process created by unusually bad weather, strikes, labor immobility, or business sector attempts to economize on raw materials.
Perhaps the most commonly cited theories of the 2008-9 recession are that the housing collapse, stock market crash, and/or the banking crisis caused people to spend less, so that the businesses serving those spenders experienced less demand for their products. Rather than cutting prices to induce customers to continue buying the quantities that they did before the recession began, those businesses decided to cut output. These spending-impulse theories may be a good description of the declines in manufacturing, residential construction, and perhaps a couple of other industries, and can explain why labor productivity increased. But such theories cannot explain the apparently increased use of other production inputs that occurred on average for the whole economy.
25 Between 2007-Q4 and 2009-Q4, log real GDP declined 0.039 and log labor hours declined 0.082, which means that other inputs increased as long as the elasticity of real GDP with respect to hours is greater than 0.48 (=39/82), even if that elasticity varies with the amount of hours. In order to conclude that other inputs increased in the non-manufacturing non-residential-construction parts of the business sector, the elasticity of real value-added with respect to hours must only exceed 0.36 (see the final column of Table 2 ).
Factor substitution motivated by a perceived increased cost of labor can explain why output and work hours fell while the usage of other inputs increased. That increase can come on the employer-side, as with an anticipated and often discussed employer tax credit for new hires, which amounts to an implicit tax hike on the payroll employers have before the tax credit goes into effect. 26 Another example is that health care reform or some other forthcoming employer regulation will create employer liabilities based on the number of employees they had in the past. Yet another possibility is that, thanks to the banking crisis, employers find payroll management more costly. In all these employerside examples, labor productivity growth is consistent with a drop in labor demand, as evidenced by lower labor compensation per hour, to which marginal workers respond by not working. For this reason, the finding in Figure 3 that both labor productivity and labor compensation per hour are greater now than they were before the recession began With consumption and work time so much lower than they were when the recession began, the theory says that people would be more willing to work now than they were then, 27 unless something else were significantly reducing their reward to work, or reducing their willingness to work. Pinpointing such "distortions" is beyond the scope of this paper, but it does find that the distortions were, at their peak, as large as a 16
percentage point increase in the labor income tax rate.
VIII. Appendix: Productivity, Labor, and Residuals in Prior Downturns
This appendix examines the input and labor supply residuals for four previous postwar recessions, and for the Great Depression of the 1930s. Real employee compensation per hour actually rises during the 1981-82 recession, and does not fall until the recovery. Both productivity and real wages are likely subject to a counter-cyclical composition bias (see section III in the body of this paper), but composition bias probably cannot explain why average hourly earnings increased rather than decreased.
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The input residual A t is measured in the quantity dimension -that is, it is a horizontal distance in Figure 7 -while the labor supply residual is measured in the price dimension (a vertical distance in the Figure) . In order to examine the two residuals in the same units, I transform the other input residual into a "productivity residual" by multiplying it by non-labor's share 0.3. Figure 9 is a scatter diagram of the labor supply residuals and productivity residuals for each of five recessions that began in 1974, 1981, 1990, 2001, and 2008 . The chart's origin indicates the values for the quarter designated as the NBER business cycle peak, and the axes measure each residual as a gap from its value at the NBER business cycle peak.
The 1980s (green) and 2008-9 (red) recessions show two very different patterns.
The 1980s recession was characterized by a reduction in the productivity residual, and little change in the labor supply residual. 30 The recovery from that recession involved a large increase in the productivity residual, but again little change in the labor supply residual by the seventh quarter after the NBER peak (the former was 1983-Q2; the business cycle trough was 1982-Q4). 31 The 2008-9 recession began with a reduction in both residuals, but it was the labor supply residual that dropped the most. Later in the recession, the productivity residual increased beyond its pre-recession values, while the labor supply residual continued to fall. A full recovery has not happened yet, but Figure   6 shows that the partial recovery so far that has occurred may have involved reductions in 29 Employment declined three percent from peak to trough. As an upper bound on the composition bias, suppose that the bias was the result of workers exiting the workforce between peak and trough in the amount of three percent of peak employment, and whose average wage was one-half of the overall average (according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2011), average hourly earnings in the private sector were $7.44, half of which would be close to the federal minimum wage of $3.35). In this case, the business cycle peak wage would underestimate the average wage of those who would be working in the trough by about 1.5 percent. 30 Despite the 1980s reduction in time worked, the labor supply residual did not fall because: (a) productivity fell, and (b) consumption per person hardly fell. 31 The labor supply residual for 1981-82 would decline about 0.02 more if real hourly wages were used in the calculation, rather than real GDP per hour, but still much less than the labor supply residual drops shown for the other four recessions.
the productivity residual, 32 as opposed to the increases associated with many of the previous recoveries.
The recession beginning in 1990 may be the one most similar to the 2008-9 recession, because the productivity residual increased significantly from peak to trough, while the labor supply residual fell. Growth in the productivity residual stopped during the 1990s recovery, while the labor supply residual returned near to its pre-recession value.
The Great Depression of the 1930s was unique in its magnitude, and therefore not shown in Figures 8 and 9 . Table 3 
IX. Appendix: Sensitivity Analysis
Many of the conclusions in this paper derived from the empirical finding that aggregate work hours dropped significantly more than output. Fortunately, aggregate work hours have been measured in various ways, depending on the sampling method, the concept of work time, and the means of eliciting work time. Regarding sampling 32 In order to maximize comparability across recessions, hours worked for the 2008-9 recession are measured differently in Figure 9 than in the rest of the paper, because the basis for my preferred measure of hours (all employee hours in all private industries) is not available prior to 2003. For the purposes of Figure 9 (and Figure 8 's real GDP and labor compensation per hour series), aggregate hours are the sum of private work hours per person (measured as the all-employees aggregate weekly hours index for the business sector) and aggregate public work hours (estimated as public sector employment times private work hours per private sector employee).
method, the U.S. government conducts a monthly survey of employers (the "establishment survey") and another monthly survey of households (the "household survey"). The establishment survey asks employers about their employees' paid work time (that is, including paid sick days and paid vacation days) during the reference week.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics projects sample measures to the entire economy for that month, and those aggregate hours can be divided by total persons aged 16 and over (regardless of employment status) to arrive at an estimate of weekly hours worked per adult.
The household survey asks respondents about their work status (and the status of other adults in the household) during the reference week and, if at work during that week, hours worked. These hours worked, counting zeros for persons not at worked can be averaged across respondents to arrive at another measure of hours worked per adult. The two differ somewhat in terms of the population covered (the establishment survey does not include agriculture or self-employed workers). The establishment survey and ATUS measures shown in Figure 10 are not available for previous recessions, and those previous recessions were too short to have a large enough sample from the household survey to accurately estimate hours changes change from peak to trough. The BLS does form an index of hours of production and non-supervisory for all private industries from the establishment survey, and has an index of hours of all business sector employees that is part of their productivity calculations (and is formed from both the establishment and household surveys). These two series disagree as to the amount that work hours dropped from peak to trough, by almost two percentage points. The household and establishment surveys for that time period disagree almost as much as to the peak to trough percentage employment change. Household Survey
